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Abstract 
Current research shows that emotions can motivate climate engagement and action, but 
precisely how has received scant attention. We propose that strong emotional responses to 
climate change result from perceiving one’s “objects of care” as threatened by climate 
change, which motivates caring about climate change itself, and in turn predicts behaviour. In 
two studies, we find that climate scientists (N=44) experience greater emotional intensity 
about climate change than do students (N=94) and the general population (N=205), and that 
patterns of emotional responses explain differences in support for climate change policy. 
Scientists tied their emotional responses to concern about consequences of climate change to 
future generations and the planet, as well as personal identities associated with responsibility 
to act. Our findings suggest that “objects of care” that link people to climate change may be 
crucial to understanding why some people feel more strongly about the issue than others, and 
how emotions can prompt action. 
Keywords:  
Climate change, emotion, care, identity, field theory, psychological distance 
 
Highlights 
• This paper sheds light on why people feel specific, or any, emotions about climate 
change and links these emotions to support for climate action 
• We demonstrate a connection between objects of care, the emotions they evoke, and 
actions to address climate change 
• Various emotion profiles may lead to different behavioural outcomes 
• Climate communication efforts should focus messages on things that people care 
about, and appeal to different self-conceptions and identities  
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1. Introduction 
The psychological study of climate change has progressed toward answering some 
major questions, such as why some accept and some deny the existence or severity of climate 
change, what barriers prevent action, and how to frame the issue to encourage acceptance and 
action. We now understand many reasons why people may not consider climate change a 
serious problem, and may not act. These range from limited cognitions that evolved from a 
different time, to factors involving trust, risk, social norms, and perceived efficacy of action 
(Gifford 2011). There is also an extensive literature around the individual factors that predict 
climate change action, such as environmental values (Steg & Vlek 2009; Van der Werff et al. 
2014), and traits such as self-transcendence and connectedness to nature (Gifford & Nilsson 
2014; Cheung et al. 2014; Brügger et al. 2011), which touch on feelings of closeness to the 
planet. Through this research, we have come to understand some of the social, cognitive, and 
behavioural aspects of climate change. However, the precise role emotions play in 
understanding responses to climate change has received relatively little attention (Roeser 
2012).  
Over time, awareness of climate change has increased. More than ever, people think 
that climate change is happening now, and will affect people and places near them, but 
emotional responses such as worry and concern remain low (Steentjes et al. 2017). Greater 
recognition of the role of emotions will help us understand not only how climate change is 
perceived by individuals, but also other interactions around climate change where emotions 
play a role: in activist groups and collective action movements (Harth et al. 2013), anti-
climate change demonstrations, in climate change denial and avoidance (Norgaard 2006), and 
in portrayals in media (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole 2009). 
Current research shows that emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt can motivate 
climate change action (Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Bissing-Olson et al., 2016; Ferguson & 
Branscombe, 2010; Harth et al., 2013; Lu & Schuldt, 2016; Mallett et al., 2013; Rees et al., 
2015). From this, two inferences have been made: 1) that those who care about climate 
change feel such emotions, and 2) inducing these emotions will elicit climate change action 
in other individuals. These inferences form the basis for interventions designed to 
emotionally appeal to the public. However, we suggest that groundwork for these inferences 
is under-developed. First, we know of no studies that have focused directly on people who 
care about climate change, or defined what it might mean to care about climate change. 
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Second, there is little information about why people feel specific, or any, emotions about 
climate change.  
1. 1 To care about climate change 
Little is known about what it means to “care about climate change”, possibly because 
it is difficult to define what caring means here. The verb “to care” has three relevant 
meanings in this context: to attach interest or importance to the object of care; to feel 
emotions such as anxiety or affection toward it; and to protect or safeguard it (i.e., to care for 
something).  
Here, “climate change” is not the object of care, because it is not an object of 
affection, or a thing to be protected. Rather, it is a threat to things about which we care. To 
care about climate change is paradoxically not about climate change itself, but about the 
things that it will harm or take away from us. A similar idea has been put forth in research on 
environmental movements (Stern et al. 1999) and the consequences of environmental loss 
(Brügger et al. 2015; Albrecht et al., 2007), where implications for valued objects, or “objects 
of care”, are central to understanding human responses to environmental decline.  
If we accept this interpretation of what it means to care about climate change, these 
objects of care could be viewed as connectors, ones that make the issue of climate change 
seem personally relevant to the individual.  
The idea of “connectors”, introduced in ecological psychology, describes the 
influences on an individual in spatial terms. Lewin (1951) theorised that the individual can be 
understood as a function of spatial maps representing their entire physical, social, and inner 
mental environments. Within this framework, any entity that can influence the individual 
(e.g., a person, place, value, goal, or event) is represented as a region of space. All these 
regions can not only affect the individual, they can affect each other too. For instance, if we 
look at the spatial environment of a person who has a child, the child can be understood as a 
region of influence that can affect the individual’s thoughts and actions (Lewin 1951). If the 
region “child” is perceived to be threatened by another region “climate change” then this may 
influence the individual’s thoughts and actions. As another example, a person may have a 
close attachment to a social or ideological group, and if this group is concerned about climate 
change, the group may serve to bring the issue closer to the individual. Yet another example 
is a person influenced by strong core values that are perceived to be threatened by climate 
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change. By connecting the self to climate change, objects of care may bring the issue of 
climate change closer. 
As implied by the term “bring closer”, each region may be located psychologically 
close to, or distantly from the individual, and these distances can change. Lewin used the 
term “locomotion” to describe the various interactions that regions may have with one 
another (Lewin 1936). For instance, an “approach” interaction may reduce distance, while an 
“avoid” interaction increases distance. In the previous example, a parent may experience an 
approach response to “climate change” to protect their child, whereas a person without 
children may not. As will become clear next, these concepts are important to understanding 
why people care about climate change. 
1.2 Psychological Distance 
Psychological distance – an indicator of how close or distant people feel from a 
particular object, event, or person – is of growing importance to climate change research, in 
part because in many studies, people report feeling distant from the impacts of climate 
change, and perceive that they will be largely unaffected (Howe, Mildenberger, Marlon, & 
Leiserowitz, 2015; Leiserowitz, 2005; Spence et al., 2012; Steentjes et al., 2017). 
Correlational studies have shown that psychological distance relates negatively to pro-
environmental action (Spence et al. 2012; Mcdonald et al. 2015), and consequently, several 
studies have tested interventions crafted to bring climate change closer to the individual – but 
the results of such studies have been mixed (Brügger, Dessai, Devine-Wright, Morton, & 
Pidgeon, 2015; Mcdonald, Chai, & Newell, 2015; McDonald, Newell, & Brewer, 2013; 
Scannell & Gifford, 2011; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010). 
One reason for the mixed results may be the operationalisation of psychological 
distance in the context of bringing climate change closer. Psychological distance is typically 
measured through perceptions of personal risk from climate change, such as when and where 
it will occur, the likelihood with which it will occur, and who will be affected by it (Spence et 
al. 2012; Brügger 2013). The argument is that proximatising climate change can make the 
issue seem more personally relevant, and more emotionally evocative (Brügger et al. 2015; 
Mcdonald et al. 2015). 
However, this approach to reduce psychological distance assumes that the “self” and 
those people and places near to it are the only objects of care; climate change is close if 
people perceive themselves to be affected by it, or distant if they do not. This method only 
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captures one reason for engaging with climate change. For this reason, it has been critiqued 
for presuming that proximity to self is necessary – and all that is necessary – to care about 
climate change (see Devine-Wright 2013, for a discussion).  
The psychological distance concept can be more broadly useful to explain the 
relationships between objects of care and the self. According to Lewin (1936), emotions such 
as fear, hope, and guilt serve as guides for behaviour, they are triggered by objects that shape 
the structure of one’s internal spatial environment. Fear, for instance, is an aversive response 
to the perception of an undesirable psychological future. “Objects of care” that appear 
threatened by climate change may trigger such emotional responses. 
Only a handful of studies have looked at emotion as a part of psychological distance 
(Brügger 2013; Van Boven et al. 2010; Hackenbracht & Gasper 2013; Davis et al. 2011). 
Objects and people that are psychologically close to us elicit stronger emotions than those 
that are distant (Hackenbracht & Gasper 2013), and conversely, feeling strong emotions can 
reduce perceptions of psychological distance from an object or event (Van Boven et al. 
2010). In the context of climate change, reducing distance can, by increasing risk perceptions, 
have similar consequences on behavioural intentions as manipulating negative emotion (fear) 
(Brügger, 2013). And while proximatising climate change can lead to greater emotional 
responses, the effect is reversed too: distancing oneself from climate change is thought to be a 
coping mechanism for potentially overwhelming feelings (Caillaud et al. 2015; Ojala 2012; 
Norgaard 2006; Dickinson 2009). 
For many people, climate change is a threat that is happening now, and yet it remains 
a distant issue emotionally (Steentjes et al. 2017). With a broader understanding of 
psychological distance, we can begin to understand why this might be the case.  
1.3 Emotions and caring about climate change 
Emotions tend to have a motivating effect on climate-relevant behaviour. The 
experience of negative affect relates to self-reported pro-environmental behaviours (Leviston 
& Walker 2012), and climate change policy support (Leiserowitz 2006; Smith & Leiserowitz 
2014). Even the incidental occurrence of emotions – emotions triggered by events unrelated 
to climate change – can influence mitigation policy preferences (Lu & Schuldt 2015). 
Notably, the relationship between emotions and climate change action is not consistent in all 
contexts, particularly those that attempt to induce the former to produce the latter. For 
instance, some research suggests that negative emotions enhance perceptions of risk (Slovic 
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et al. 2004), and greater perceptions of risk from climate change may then lead to increased 
action motivation. However, fear appeals—persuasive messages that stir negative emotions—
can sometimes be counterproductive (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole 2009). Similarly, messages 
of hope have been found to increase action in some cases (Myers et al. 2012; Ojala 2012a) 
and reduce it in others by lowering risk perceptions (Hornsey & Fielding 2016).  
As Chapman, Lickel and Markowitz (2017) argue, such approaches tend to treat 
emotions as a lever, where pulling the correct one will produce the desired behaviour. There 
is a level of complexity in emotional responses that cannot be captured without looking in 
detail at the triggers for these emotions, the objects that cause these emotions to arise. For 
instance, during the Copenhagen Climate Summit, a representative of Tuvalu unexpectedly 
introduced emotion into his formal address, expressing intense sadness about the state of 
negotiations and the fate of his nation (Farbotko & McGregor 2010). The anticipated loss of a 
valued place or entity, such as one’s nation, may be a critical trigger for emotion, and 
negative emotion in particular has the function of rectifying or acting to avoid adverse 
consequences (Keltner & Lerner 2010). 
A considerable body of work exists on triggers for emotions, mainly within appraisal-
theoretical models of emotion, and particularly in perceptions of environmental risk (Keller et 
al. 2012; Böhm & Pfister 2000). These approaches stem from the argument that emotions are 
about something or someone, and arise when an event is relevant for one’s values and 
concerns (Zeelenberg et al. 2008). Böhm and Pfister have extensively examined how the 
relationship between cognitions and behaviour toward environmental risks are mediated by 
emotional evaluations, showing that two particular cognitive appraisals, one concerning the 
anticipation of negative consequences and loss, and one concerning whether ethical and 
moral principles have been violated, relate to different emotional and behavioural outcomes 
(Böhm & Pfister, 2017; Pfister & Böhm, 2008; Böhm, 2003; Böhm & Pfister, 2000). These 
approaches inform and are compatible with the concept of “objects of care”, following the 
same premise, that perceptions of risk or threat to valued objects lead to emotional, and 
behavioural responses.  
The advantage of such approaches is the ability to explain why individuals respond 
differently to the same environmental threats (Smith & Kirby 2009). In one study, Böhm and 
Pfister (2017) focused specifically on whether identities affect one’s appraisals of 
environmental risk, in a study that asked participants to adopt the perspective of different 
roles (a mayor, a parent, and an environmental activist). While the effects of social role on 
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appraisals were not strong, the authors recommend future work that looks in detail at those 
who possess such identities – an aim of the present study.  
 Since most research in this area are surveys or experiments which constrain 
responses, they may not accurately reflect how people spontaneously understand, or 
misunderstand climate change, nor the competing influences on affective responses to climate 
change. The value of qualitative analyses in this context lies in the ability to view the 
emotions and cognitions that people express in a bottom-up manner, that does not constrain 
responses. There is also the opportunity to see how people understand and misunderstand the 
issue, and the often competing reasons underlying affective responses to climate change 
(Wolf & Moser 2011).  
Perhaps the most extensive qualitative work on climate change emotions was 
conducted by Fischer et al. (2012), who interviewed residents in five European nations, 
studying social representations of energy production and consumption. They found that 
affective responses to climate change were a recurrent theme. The most common emotions 
were concern and worry, used interchangeably, and motivated by anticipated harm to children 
and grandchildren (Fischer et al. 2012). Other emotions, such as confusion, resignation, and 
powerlessness, were mentioned alongside perceptions of low individual efficacy. 
Interviews of Norwegian adults also found that low efficacy and negative emotions 
characterised responses to climate change (Norgaard 2006). Participants described fears 
associated with a loss of ontological security (helplessness and uncertainty about the future, 
and how life would continue). They also expressed guilt for residing in a rich nation that has 
benefited from fossil fuels; this was perceived as a threat to their Norwegian identity as good, 
socially just people. It appears that climate change threatened their notions of the future and 
of themselves, but the need to act was countered by a low sense of efficacy.  
There have also been studies of groups who may have atypical experiences of climate 
change. For instance, Lefsrud and Meyer (2012) studied the discursive construction of 
climate change from the perspective of scientists and engineers working in the petroleum 
industry. The most emotionally expressive group were those who felt their identities as 
experts most threatened, and felt that action on climate change would be more detrimental 
than inaction because of feared effects on the economy. These emotions can be interpreted as 
responses to the perception of threat to various objects of care: their identities, and economic 
wellbeing. The responses to such threats were expressed in emotional, figurative language, 
and there was an “approach” tendency, or a “call to arms” to encourage protests.  
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Another case study looked at villagers in Tibet (Byg & Salick 2009). To the villagers, 
climate change caused anxiety and worry, its meaning entwined with numerous spiritual 
beliefs about the world and nature. These emotions were associated with the loss of natural 
beauty, the destruction of humans and the Earth, and frustration about suffering from the 
actions of others, from a situation that is largely out of their control.  
The qualitative studies reviewed above suggest that factors such as attachment to 
nature, threat to self-identity, and anticipated harm to future generations, may be objects of 
care that link various groups to climate change, however, none explicitly sought to identify 
objects that lead people to care about climate change. Further, they did not specifically 
sample people who cared about climate change. The aforementioned studies have looked 
closely at reactions from occupational groups, national groups, and others have focused 
specifically on teachers (Lombardi & Sinatra 2013), and young people (Strazdins & Skeat 
2011), however, to understand the emotions of those who care about climate change, and why 
they care, we need to look at different samples. 
It is difficult to ascertain which groups are best to study a priori, but there are several 
feasible populations: people who have personally experienced the effects of climate change, 
climate change activists, and climate scientists. It is reasonable to think that active 
engagement with climate change, of the kind experienced by members of these groups, may 
represent emotional and psychological closeness to the issue. Such engagement may have led 
to development of a richer, more nuanced set of emotional responses. By focusing on such a 
group, we can explore their emotional reactions to climate change, why they are emotionally 
close and what that looks like.  
Climate scientists are an important group to study, partly because the scientific 
consensus is a persistent issue of social confusion (Steentjes et al. 2017), but also because 
scientists are important messengers in climate change communication. Recent projects have 
highlighted the emotional responses of climate scientists as a way of engaging people with 
climate change (Climate Council 2016; Duggan 2015). One example is the “Is This How You 
Feel?” Project (ITHYF), which asks climate scientists from around the world to write letters 
about how they feel about climate change (Duggan 2015). Duggan’s project is unique in that 
it asks a group of people who are occupationally close to climate change to explain how they 
feel about the issue, rather than what they think.  
We explore why people feel emotions about climate change by comparing the 
qualitative responses of climate scientists from the ITHYF project with that of university 
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students (Study 1) and a general population sample (Study 2), as research to date typically 
focuses on the latter two samples. With the premise that caring about climate change is linked 
to perceiving threat to one’s objects of care, we explore the emotional reactions to climate 
change in all three samples, and any connection with objects of care. Aside from replicating 
qualitative findings in a wider context, Study 2 also asked whether these emotions predict 
support for climate policy.  
2. Study 1 
The first study examined responses from climate scientists using data collected 
externally by the ITHYF project, in addition to responses from a new survey conducted by 
the current authors, asking students to report their feelings about climate change. 
2.1 Method 
The scientist data (N = 44) were collected from the ITHYF website 
(www.isthishowyoufeel.com), where it is freely accessible. Scientists were approached 
through individual emails. They were asked to write a letter addressing the question “How do 
you feel about climate change?”—with a focus on the emotions they feel toward climate 
change—for the purposes of science communication (more detail in Supplementary 
Material). The student data were collected from a sample (N = 94, 60% female, mean age = 
20 years) of psychology students at the University of Western Australia, remunerated with 
course credit. The students were asked to “Please write a few sentences in response to the 
following question: How do you feel about climate change?”, and additionally answered 
questions about rainfall in Western Australia for a separate study.  
The initial analysis involved open coding of both student and scientist text, using 
RQDA, a package for qualitative analysis available through the R open-source software 
(Huang 2016). The method draws upon the constructivist version of Grounded Theory and 
axial coding (Strauss & Corbin 1998; Charmaz 2014). We began with open coding (coding 
words or phrases found in text), and axial coding (creating themes or categories by grouping 
codes) and constant comparison of data. Codes were generated inductively and included 
codes relating to climate change belief, climate change consequences, emotions, as well as 
references to spatial, social and temporal relationships. To triangulate across analytic 
methods, the data were also simultaneously analysed using Leximancer software. Leximancer 
differs from other programs that facilitate qualitative research, such as NVivo, in that it 
employs algorithms to detect main ideas from a corpus of text and calculates relationships 
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between ideas. The themes extracted by Leximancer, and the results from open coding were 
used as a guide for a content analysis using Grounded Theory. For a more detailed discussion 
of the Leximancer analysis, see Supplementary Material 
2.2 Results 
The codes of highest frequency are shown in Table 1 (data for Study 2 are also shown 
for later reference). For students, the most frequent responses were: “I think”, denoting 
statements about the existence and attributions of climate change; “lack knowledge”, about 
needing more information about climate change; and “action”, about the need to act on 
climate change. The most frequent responses from scientists were: “optimism” about 
addressing climate change; “global”, a reference to the planet; “future generations”; and a 
wide range of emotions (a full list of codes can be found in Supplementary Material).  
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show content maps illustrating the themes auto-extracted by 
Leximancer. Scientist responses are spatially distant from the student responses. The scientist 
responses are also separately positioned, not encompassed by any other theme, whereas the 
student responses are placed within the “happening” theme, suggesting that terms such as  
Table 1.  
Most frequent tags for each sample 
Top 
tags 
Study 1 Study 2 
Students (No.)  Scientists (No.) General population (No.) 
1 "I think" 55 hope 21 "I think" 60 
2 lack knowledge 24 the world/planet/Earth 20 worried 33 
3 pro-environmental action 18 future generations 19 future generations 25 
4 humanity 15 humanity 17 natural causes 24 
5 climate consequences 15 frustrated 16 the government 21 
6 natural causes 13 close relationships 13 sceptic 14 
7 future generations 12 climate consequences 13 "my issue"† 14 
8 urgency 10 responsibility 13 Agenda 12 
 
† A few codes were newly introduced in the general population sample, as they had not arisen in the two 
samples in Study 1. “My issue” was used to encode responses where the respondent used the outlet to 
voice their concern for an issue besides climate change, such as: corporate donations to political parties, 
population growth, religious fanaticism, etc.  
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Figure 1. Concept map of scientist responses: direct mentions of concepts by scientists are 
indicated by red connections. Concepts are denoted by grey nodes, and they are connected by 
grey lines, which refer to strong connections between concepts. The size of the grey nodes 
indicates the frequency of the node. Themes (concepts that encompass many other concepts) 
are indicated by coloured text, located within coloured circles. The warmth of the colour of 
the circles denotes the centrality of a theme to the entire text (warm to cool = red, yellow, 
green, blue, purple). 
 
Figure 2. Concept map of student responses: mentions of concepts by students are indicated 
by red lines.  
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“happening”, and nearby terms “believe”, “real”, dominate student responses. Another 
difference can be seen in connections denoted by red lines in Figure 2, between the source of 
the text (scientist or student), and the topic of discussion (e.g. children): the key difference is 
the lack of connection between the students and the concepts relating to emotion. 
2.2.1 Analysis of scientist responses 
The scientist responses were run through Leximancer in the same manner as described 
for the entire sample. Themes were automatically extracted, and then examined in greater 
detail. As Leximancer does not analyse the meaning of the words used, subsequent analyses 
were conducted manually to investigate the contextual meaning of word use. We took each 
theme extracted by Leximancer, and listed each mention of those words and their surrounding 
context from the original text, resulting in a document structured according to the themes. 
The extracted texts were examined for consistency within themes, and overlap between 
themes, as well as irrelevance or erroneous classification. There was strong correspondence 
between the final themes and those from the initial open coding. 
2.2.1.1 Emotions about climate change. Most scientists referred to a multiplicity of 
emotions, “So, what do I feel about climate change? Interest, intellectual curiosity, 
satisfaction, excitement, extreme worry, sadness, fear and perhaps a glimmer of hope.”, and 
describe feeling conflicted, “I feel nervous. I get worried and anxious, but also a little 
curious. The curiosity is a strange, paradoxical feeling that I sometimes feel guilty about”. 
The emotional reactions were related to mentions of climate change as a challenge, for 
instance, confusion or frustration about the lack of acceptance of scientific evidence: “Why do 
I feel bemusement? Because the scientific case is clear”, and dislike of what was perceived to 
be the role of scientists: “What motivated me to become a scientist in the first place was my 
desire to explain and model things we did not understand. It was never about preaching  to 
others about an existing scientific consensus. I feel uncomfortable in this strange role nearly 
as much as I am in discussing about believing or not in climate change”. 
As for the wider challenge of addressing climate change, multiple emotions were 
evoked, some negative, “I often feel compelled to be outraged by our own inability as a 
species to respond to the challenge climate change poses”, and some positive, “I am hopeful 
that we can solve the climate problem. It is a huge challenge because it requires international 
collaboration, and for people to act on behalf of others”. 
2.2.1.2 Hope and humanity. This theme was characterised by the connection 
between two concepts, hope and the perception of humans. Many scientists referred to 
EMOTIONS AND CLIMATE POLICY 
 
 14 
themselves as optimists, and expressed faith in humanity as reason for their hope, “But, I also 
have a sense of hope. Humanity has shown throughout history that we can solve our 
problems”. These statements expressed the view that climate change can be successfully 
addressed, and tended to be positioned at the end of responses, to end on a positive note.  
Whether “hope” was mentioned depended on whether the view of humans was 
positive or negative. When the view of humans was positive, there was optimism, and when 
the view of humans was negative, there was pessimism: “We face a problem that could be 
addressed with relatively minor shared sacrifices, but instead there is a mass effort to ignore, 
defer, deny, and lie… Global warming doesn’t bother me as much as what it is revealing 
about humans”. A negative view of humans was associated not with hope, but “Despair: 
humans are incredibly dumb. We find it very hard to think beyond me, here and now. Yet our 
task is to fix a generation of problems that are global and centennial – to learn and share a 
finite planet”.  
2.2.1.3 Human-Earth relationship. The third theme was called “Human-Earth 
relationship”, because use of the terms “world” or “planet” referred to relationships between 
humans and the Earth. Some concretised closeness to the Earth using anthropomorphic 
metaphors for friendship, “How can anyone not feel an overwhelming sense of care and 
responsibility when those so dear to us are so desperately ill?”, or as a doctor to a patient, 
“Imagine how a medical doctor feels having to inform their patient, an old, life-long friend, 
of a dire but treatable diagnosis… …There is a similar closeness between climate scientists 
and the planet. There’s a sense of wonder and respect”. In some cases, identities were used to 
explain their relationship to the Earth, “we grew up with the concept of being stewards of the 
land and we care about the future abilities of farmers to be able to feed the world”, “.  
Scientists alternately described a nurturing relationship between humans and the 
Earth, and the ways in which humans have mistreated the Earth. “How can you ignore the 
severe sickness of someone you are so intricately connected to and dependent upon?”, “Our 
biodiversity is our life support system, each species a precious support system, each species a 
precious, irreplaceable heritage item”, statements of nurture are juxtaposed with how 
humans have not reciprocated, “We have harvested and cleared and plundered and spoiled”, 
“We humans are fouling our own nest, so to speak”. Also present were visions and hope for a 
better relationship in future, “I am not yet willing to give up on a future where humans live 
lightly upon the planet”. 
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2.2.1.4 Future Generations. Scientists often referred to “future generations” 
(interspersed with the terms “children” or “grandchildren”) in their responses, with a 
narrative of loss and responsibility. There was a strong connection between the emotions and 
care for future generations. The responses referred to future generations experiencing loss, 
“most of all I feel so very sorry for my children’s and my (hypothetical) grandchildren’s 
generation, for all the beautiful things in the world that they will miss”, “looking at my 
children and realizing that they won't have the same quality of life we had”. This loss was 
coupled with statements about responsibility, relating either to the notion that one ought to 
care for one’s children, “What world are we leaving to our children and grandchildren?”, or 
to the notion that climate change is this generation’s problem, “As a human-being, and 
especially as a parent, I feel concerned that we are doing damage to the planet, I don’t want 
to leave a mess for my children, or anyone else’s children, to clear-up”. 
2.2.1.5 Identities. Scientists discussed a variety of identities in each of the 
aforementioned themes, speaking not only “as scientists”, but as parents, as citizens, humans, 
people of their generation, and as messengers (whose responsibility it is to relay the message 
about climate change to others). “I also consider it my duty as a scientist and as a citizen to 
try to inform the public and policy makers clearly about the predicament we are in and the 
choices we cannot avoid”, “I don’t want to become the generation that future children talk of 
as having destroyed the planet. I’d like to be the generation that fought back (and won) 
against human induced climate change” (for more examples, see Supplementary Materials). 
Perhaps due to different terms being used to denote each identity, such a theme did not 
emerge from the Leximancer analysis.  
2.2.2 Analysis of student responses 
2.2.2.1 Belief in climate change. The first theme concerned students’ beliefs about 
climate change. Despite being asked about their feelings towards climate change, most 
respondents began responses by stating their opinions, “I feel that climate change is a real, 
major issue that needs to be addressed now before it’s too late”. Although none expressed the 
view that climate change was not real, there was low concern, “maybe its because im selfish, i 
would not go too much out of my way to help make a change as i do not think the effects will 
have much of an effect on me in my lifetime”, and scepticism, “I do not feel as though it is an 
issue of great concern and I also feel as though claims that climate change will completely 
change how we live as humans is completely false”. 
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Statements about whether climate change was real were often followed by whether the 
cause was natural or anthropogenic. Many statements referred to climate change being in part 
a natural process, “I feel that it is happening and that humans should definitely attempt to 
reduce it. Of course in some ways, I believe climate change is natural and although humans 
are simply helping to speed up the process, climate change would still happen regardless if 
humans existed or not”. Those who attributed climate change to anthropogenic causes tended 
to blame others, “I feel that it is real and that it is happening right now largely due to the 
irresponsible actions of humans (mostly large corporations and some governments) over the 
past few decades”, or abstract, systemic sources such as modern lifestyles, “a lot of it is also 
due to how we engage in our activities (with such a fast-paced lifestyle, constant stress due to 
work, the need to travel. These things are hard to offset due to the nature of how life works 
now)”. Responses also echoed scepticism from popular rhetoric such as “we need more 
research to know for sure about climate change”, and wariness of coercion, “I am not 
sceptical of climate change itself, only wary that it is a highly emotive topic whose 
importance has the potential to become overly inflated by political agenda and popular 
beliefs. I do think further research should be made towards climate change so that opinions 
can be formed based on quantitative results.” 
2.2.2.2 Future Generations. Students tended to perceive climate change as a 
problem for the future, coupled with suggestions that other issues are of more immediate 
concern, “…because the effects of climate change are only just starting to show, as this is a 
very early stage”. Students indicated that future generations would be affected. Some used 
similar terms as scientists – referring to future generations as children, or as members of their 
group, “I see it as being pretty unfair to have our future children deal with the problems we 
left them”, “it will affect the future well-being of us and the next generation”. Others referred 
to future generations as an outgroup, “it is imperative to educate the future generation about 
the importance of looking after the earth”, “awareness about climate change needs to be 
spread to the younger generation”.  
2.2.2.3 Feel. While emotion was absent from most student responses, some did 
reference fear. “It is happening and terrifying”, and for some, fear seemed debilitating, “I am 
scared of the outcomes of climate change. Especially due to the way it does not seem to be a 
priority problem for most people. I feel like I should do as much as possible to reduce my 
waste, energy and water use, but I often try it hard not to let the thought of climate change 
become too overwhelming big and that I cannot change anything”.  
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2.2.2.4 Action. Many responses discussed how climate change ought to be addressed. 
As individuals, students were not empowered to act, “its a major problem and I would like to 
be part of the solution but I do not know how”, corresponding with the “lack knowledge” 
theme that arose from open coding. Students thought that action should be taken as a 
collective, “I think that each individual should change their lifestyle a little bit to reduce 
waste…”. Another frequent response was to “othering”, where responsibility for, and the 
impact of acting was attributed to governments and large organisations, “it is most important 
that it is addressed at the level of government and industry. Individuals can help but 
legislation could have a larger impact”, “it is better to focus on the big companies that have 
much larger carbon footprints”.  
2.3 Discussion 
The aim of Study 1 was to explore content analysis of emotional responses to climate 
change in two specific groups, climate scientists and students. The findings suggest important 
differences in the emotional experience of climate change. The high presence of emotional 
content in the scientist sample compared to the student sample was expected. Hope, anger, 
and frustration were the most commonly expressed emotions by scientists, whereas themes 
arising from the student sample showed a general lack of emotion. For students, the focus 
was more cognitive than emotional, such as whether they believed it was happening, whether 
humans were responsible, who would be affected, and who should act. Contemplating one’s 
belief about climate change may be superficial but necessary before any further 
considerations about climate change are possible. Another possibility is that we were not 
explicit enough about the request for emotional responses. Students may have interpreted the 
word “feel” as a request for thoughts and opinions. By contrast, scientists were given a 
clearer request for emotional responses. This potential limitation will be addressed in Study 
2. 
Interestingly, the topics discussed by students can be seen as more directly related to 
climate change than the topics discussed by scientists. The pragmatics of action and concerns 
about the impact and reality of climate change are directly related to climate change as an 
issue. However, for students, there was little connection between climate change and other 
issues, whereas topics raised by scientists were less about climate change than about the 
things affected by climate change (children, the planet, humanity). For scientists, climate 
change had broader connectivity to other areas of life.  
EMOTIONS AND CLIMATE POLICY 
 
 18 
This supports the conceptualisation of “caring about climate change” proposed in the 
Introduction, that one’s care for objects affected by climate change is central to caring about 
climate change itself. There were strong references in the scientist responses to close 
relationships; two themes describe close relationships to entities (the planet and future 
generations) adversely affected by climate change. For scientists, caring about those entities 
may then lead to caring about climate change, or vice versa. The close relationships to the 
planet and to future generations may be connectors to a sense of closeness to climate change, 
because they link the self to climate change. 
Further, for scientists, climate change permeated multiple self-identities, had broader 
connectivity with other aspects of the self, and these identities were tied to emotional 
reactions to climate change. The challenge posed by climate change prompted scientists to 
refer to a personal identity, a parental identity, a collective human identity, a scientist 
identity, and a messenger identity. These identities were also tied to different, often 
conflicting emotions, as scientists (curiosity) or as parents (worry, fear). Responsibility to act 
was linked to role-based relationships, as friends, stewards, and as a doctor to a patient. On 
the other hand, students made little reference to themselves or their identities, and this 
suggests that climate change is disconnected from their self-conception.  
3. Study 2 
In Study 2, we were interested in establishing whether emotional responses similar to 
those elicited by scientists would be present in the general population, and whether those 
responses predict climate change action. With these considerations in mind, Study 2 included 
both qualitative and quantitative questions about climate change emotions, and measures of 
climate change policy support. We also addressed a potential methodological limitation from 
Study 1, clarifying instructions to emphasise that we were interested in emotional responses 
to climate change.  
Findings from Study 1 suggest that no single emotion dominates scientists’ emotional 
responses, but rather, many emotions are involved.  This supports some perspectives in 
emotion research (Chapman, Lickel & Markowitz, 2017; Zeelenberg, et al. 2008) – to study 
individual emotions separately is to view an incomplete picture. Fernando et al (2014) found 
that the combined experience of anger and shame, as well as sympathy with a victimised 
group constitute a “strong pro-social emotion” response that strongly predicts collective 
action to remedy intergroup inequality.  
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It is possible that the interplay of several emotions, which tends to reflect the actual 
experience of emotion, provides a better understanding of how emotions and behaviour 
relate. The emotion profile method developed by Siemer et al. (2007), applied to the 
collective action setting (Fernando et al., 2014), uses hierarchical clustering to identify 
groups of participants who respond similarly to one another. We used this method in Study 2 
to identify different types of emotional responses to climate change (e.g. one group might 
experience high anger, and low guilt; another the reverse) so that each type is an “emotion 
profile” of how people respond emotionally to climate change. To the authors’ knowledge, 
this will be the first use of emotion profiles in the context of climate change action. 
Study 2 examined the experience of emotions about climate change in two ways: 
firstly, by replicating the previous method used with the scientist and student samples, and 
comparing these with how a sample from the general population feels about climate change; 
and secondly, by identifying different profiles of emotions and testing whether these profiles 
predicted climate change action.  
3.1 Method 
A general sample of 205 participants in the Sydney area was recruited for Study 2 
using Qualtrics Panels. The sample was roughly representative of the general Australian 
population by age and gender, with moderate deviations in the “25-54” and  “65 +” age 
categories (Table 2).  
Participants were asked an open-ended question about their feelings and emotions 
about climate change. The instructions made clear that we were asking about emotions: “We 
are interested in your feelings and emotions towards climate change. Your response can be 
Table 2 
Sampled Distribution Compared to Australian Population 
 Sample (%) 
Population 
(%)* 
Sex Female 50.73 50.70 Male 49.27 49.30 
Age 
  
  
  
18-24 11.71 12.29 
25-54 66.34 53.38 
55-64 12.68 14.74 
65+ 9.27 19.09 
* Data has been corrected to exclude the population under 18 years. 
Population data were obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014). 
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any length, from a few lines to several paragraphs. There are no correct answers, please 
write about the emotions (if any) you feel when you think about climate change. How do you 
feel about climate change?”.  
Participants were then asked to indicate how strongly they experienced a series of 
emotions when thinking about climate change. The emotions were rated along a 5-point scale 
from 1 = Not at all, to 5 = Strongly (the list of emotions was adapted from Leviston et al. 
2014a). 
The dependent variables were climate change policy support (adapted from Leviston 
et al. 2014a) and support for budget increases to benefit the environment. Participants were 
asked to indicate their support for change to the environmental budget for protecting the 
environment. The scale was anchored by a “50% or greater” decrease in budget allocation, 
and a “50% or greater” increase in budget allocation, with scale points for each 10% 
increment (e.g. -40%, -30%, -20%). More details about the method are in Supplementary 
Materials.  
3.2 Results 
The analytic strategy followed that of Study 1. The most frequent codes were: “I 
think” (responses that express participants’ beliefs rather than their emotions about climate 
change); “future generations”; “natural causes” (referring to climate change as a natural 
phenomenon); and “the government” (referring to statements that the government ought to 
act on climate change) (see Table 1).  
The general responses were analysed using Leximancer, both in combination with the 
scientist and student samples, and separately. The result of a simultaneous analysis of all 
three texts is shown in Figure 3. The figure shows that the different sources are located 
distantly from one another: scientist responses are more closely related to positive and 
negative emotions about climate change, whereas student responses are located nearer to 
words referring to belief in climate change, and general responses are more closely connected 
to concerns about the natural environment, and belief in climate change.  
A comparison of the frequency of emotions in the general population sample of the 
current study and the scientists and students from Study 1 is shown graphically in Figure 4. 
The themes emerging from analysis are shown in Table 3, along with a comparison of themes 
emerging from the scientist, student and general population samples see Table 3. The 
qualitative responses from the general sample are in Supplementary Materials. 
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Figure 3. Leximancer automatic output showing the relationship between scientist, student and 
general responses to how they feel about climate change. 
 
 
Figure 4. The frequency of emotion codes in qualitative responses from student, scientist and 
general samples. More frequent emotional content is depicted by greater deviation from the centre. 
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Table 3 
Final themes for scientists, students and general population samples 
Scientists (Study 1) Students (Study 1) General Sample (Study 2) 
1) Emotions about climate 
change 
Negative emotions; climate 
change evidence; climate 
change as a challenge 
1) Belief in climate change Is climate change real; natural or anthropogenic; political 1) Belief in climate change 
Is climate change real; natural or 
anthropogenic; political 
“I feel nervous. I get worried and anxious, but also a little 
curious. The curiosity is a strange, paradoxical feeling that I 
sometimes feel guilty about”. (Respondent AG) 
 
“I often feel compelled to be outraged by our own inability as a 
species to respond to the challenge climate change poses” 
(Respondent CB) 
“I believe climate change is real and its happening now and its 
harmful to people and the environment” (Respondent 81) 
 
“I think it is happening but it is just part of the earth’s natural 
fluctuations. Also it is not happening as quick as some people may 
think”, (Respondent 13) 
“I do not really have any feelings about it. I know it is happening 
but I am not exactly passionate about doing something about it” 
(Respondent 153) 
 
“Is not real. and if it is it’s because of nature not humans” 
(Respondent 151) 
2) Hope and Humanity Hope; humans 2) Future Generations Early stage; future generations 2) Emotions Worry& concern; anger 
“But, I also have a sense of hope. Humanity has shown 
throughout history that we can solve our problems” 
(Respondent MM) 
 
“Despair: humans are incredibly dumb. We find it very hard to 
think beyond me, here and now” (Respondent MR) 
“…the effects of climate change are only just starting to show, as 
this is a very early stage” (Respondent 69) 
 
“it will affect the future well-being of us and the next generation” 
(Respondent 48) 
“I feel extreme anger and sadness when I think about climate 
change, I feel ashamed to be human when I see the destruction 
caused to our native fauna and flora” (Respondent 5) 
 
“I worry for future generations – my daughter and her children 
and so on. It’s obvious that the world is changing and not for the 
better” (Respondent 2) 
3) Human-Earth 
relationship 
Close relationship; nurture, 
reciprocity 
3) Emotion 
 Fear 3) Preserve Earth for future 
Destruction of Earth; worsening; 
future generations 
How can you ignore the severe sickness of someone you are so 
intricately connected to and dependent upon?” (Respondent 
TM) 
 
“Our biodiversity is our life support system, each species a 
precious support system, each species a precious, irreplaceable 
heritage item” (Respondent LH) 
“I am scared of the outcomes of climate change. Especially due to 
the way it does not seem to be a priority problem for most people. 
I feel like I should do as much as possible to reduce my waste, 
energy and water use, but I often try it hard not to let the thought 
of climate change become too overwhelming big and that I cannot 
change anything” (Respondent 7) 
“humans are destroying the planet” (Respondent 173) 
 
“Worry about the impacts of climate change on the environment 
and the animals that are going extinct. Also the health impacts on 
the population and especially the unknown impacts on the next 
generations” (Respondent 164) 
4) Future Generations Loss; responsibility 4) Action Lack knowledge; collective action; government & business 4) Action and Government 
Collective action; government; 
politicians 
“most of all I feel so very sorry for my children’s and my 
(hypothetical) grandchildren’s generation, for all the beautiful 
things in the world that they will miss” (Respondent DG) 
 
“What world are we leaving to our children and 
grandchildren?” (Respondent PT) 
“its a major problem and I would like to be part of the solution 
but I do not know how” (Respondent 64) 
 
“it is most important that it is addressed at the level of government 
and industry. Individuals can help but legislation could have a 
larger impact” (Respondent 33) 
“can be done only if everyone in the world willing to do it” 
(Respondent 88) 
 
“This is an area where I feel our government lets us down as we 
are behind the standards of nations in similar economic positions” 
(Respondent 143) 
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Using participants’ responses to the quantitative questions, we employed hierarchical 
clustering using Ward’s method, with distances computed using squared Euclidean distance. 
The analysis allowed us to identify groups of participants who reported similar emotional 
responses to climate change, in so doing creating ‘profiles’ of emotions. With a visual 
inspection of the dendrogram, and using a range of internal validation criteria (e.g. Dunn 
index) computed through “clValid”, a package for R (Brock, Pihur, Datta & Datta, 2008; see 
Supplementary Materials for details), we determined that a both a 4-cluster and an 8-cluster 
solution would be acceptable structures, with the former being slightly better, likely due to 
sample size. The latter divided each of the four clusters into sub-groups. The 4-cluster 
solution was adopted, but we also looked at the subgroups created in the 8-cluster solution to 
explore the structure of the four cluster groups.  
We began the analysis by looking at the 4-cluster solution, which revealed the 
following clusters: “Strong Negative Emotion” (N=45), those who reported roughly the same 
negative emotions as scientists, particularly anger and fear, but with low hope; “Weak 
Negative Emotion” (N=79), those who reported similar negative emotions, but at a low 
intensity; “No Emotion” (N=49), those experiencing low intensity levels of both negative and 
positive emotion; and “Ambivalent” (N=32), those experiencing both positive emotions and 
negative emotions. The relationship between profiles and measured emotions is shown in 
Figure 5. 
Figure 5. The four emotion profiles. The figure shows the intensity at which each of the 
measured emotions is experienced by participants in each profile.  
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To investigate how emotion profiles related to climate action, we compared the 
clusters on support for climate change policies, and support for budget increases to protect 
the environment. Figure 6 shows standardised scores for both variables, for each emotion 
profile. 
The Strong Negative Emotion group showed high support for both policy support and 
budget increase, whereas the No Emotion group showed low support for both. As there were 
unequal cell sizes between cluster groups, a non-parametric multivariate analysis was 
conducted to assess differences between clusters. A Kruskall-Wallis test showed significant 
differences between groups for both policy support, χ2 (3) = 45.504, p <0.001, and budget 
increases, χ2 (3) = 40.277, p <0.001.  
Post-hoc comparisons using Mann-Whitney tests show that Strong Negative Emotion 
and Weak Negative Emotion differed for both policy support, p =0.002, r2 = 0.07, and budget 
increase, p =0.003, r2 = 0.07. Similarly, Weak Negative Emotion also differed significantly 
from the No Emotion group for both policy support, p <0.001, r2 = 0.11, and budget increase, 
p <0.001, r2 = 0.16. Finally, a comparison of Weak Negative Emotion and Ambivalent groups 
showed no significant difference between groups for either policy support, p =0.658, or 
budget increase, p =0.858. For a detailed analysis of emotion clusters with other climate 
change-related variables, see Supplementary Material. 
 
Figure 6. Support for budget increase and policy support by emotion profile. Standard error is 
shown. 
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We also analysed the objects of care mentioned by the participants, according to these 
four profiles. Not all participants mentioned any objects of care, as the question only asked 
about emotions – for those who did, the objects that they were concerned about emerged 
spontaneously. A list of 19 objects of care were mentioned by participants, ranging from 
“future generations” as the most common, to specific places such as the Great Barrier Reef.  
Figure 7 shows the frequency with which each object of care was mentioned, 
according to cluster group. The Strong Negative cluster generated the most mentions of 
objects of care (42), despite there being only 45 participants. The Weak Negative cluster (N= 
79) generated 30 objects of care, and the Ambivalent cluster (N=32) generated 13, while the 
No Emotion group (N=49) generated only 4. Of the objects of care mentioned, “future 
generations” were the most common (27 times), followed by “animals” (12), and “the 
environment” (8). 
 
 Although the 8-cluster solution was not as optimal as the 4-cluster solution, it still 
provided a decent fit to the data. This solution divided Strong Negative, Weak Negative and 
No Emotion clusters into smaller sub-groups. Although the cell sizes for some of these  
 
Figure 7. Qualitative mentions of “objects of care” by each cluster 
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groups are small, we examined these subgroups further (Table 4). The Strong Negative 
Emotion cluster was split into two groups that differed with respect to self-referential 
emotions relating to blame (shame and guilt), one group had high scores in self-blaming 
emotions such as shame and guilt, while the other had lower scores. The Weak Negative 
emotion cluster split into three groups: a low intensity self-blame group, a group that 
primarily reported fear and confusion, and a group that showed primarily hope. The No  
 
Table 4 
Clusters of emotion profiles  
Part of 
cluster Name N Highs Lows Intensity Description 
Strong 
Negative Self-blame 19 
Shame, guilt, 
powerless, despair, 
fear, anger 
Joy, boredom, 
excitement High 
Strong negative 
emotion with self-
referential emotions 
Strong 
Negative Other-blame 26 
Anger, fear, 
irritation 
Joy, hope, 
excitement, 
boredom, 
apathy 
High 
Strong negative 
emotion without self-
referential emotions 
Weak 
Negative 
Moderate 
Optimist 12 
Hope, anger, 
excitement, fear  Despair, joy Low 
Medium negative 
emotions. Highest in 
hope and excitement 
Weak 
Negative 
Low self-
blame 37 
Anger, fear, 
powerlessness, 
shame 
Boredom, joy Low 
Similar to “self-
blame” but lower 
intensity 
Weak 
Negative 
Scared & 
Confused 30 
Fear, 
powerlessness, 
confusion 
Joy, boredom Low 
Weakly felt emotions, 
mostly in fear and 
powerlessness 
No 
Emotion 
Disengaged 
Optimist 34 Hope 
Everything 
else Low Positive but apathetic 
No 
Emotion Fed Up 15 Boredom, irritation 
Everything 
else High 
Bored and irritated 
with the issue 
Ambivalen
t Ambivalent 32 
Hope, apathy, 
despair, 
excitement 
Everything 
else medium Medium 
Medium scores in 
everything 
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Emotion group was divided into two as well: a group of participants with low emotion scores 
for everything except hope, and another with low scores for everything except boredom and 
irritation. The ambivalent group remained the same. The relationship between sub-groups and 
emotion is shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. 
 The relationship between sub-groups and climate action is shown in Figure 10. The 
findings mirror that of the four clusters, but the analysis of sub-groups reveals important 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Sub-groups for No Emotion (grey) cluster and Ambivalent (black) cluster 
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Figure 8. Sub-groups for Weak Negative (black) and Strong Negative (grey) clusters 
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differences, particularly for the Weak Negative cluster. Notably, the “Scared and Confused” 
subgroup is less willing to support climate action than the other two sub-groups in the cluster. 
On the other hand, the “Low Self Blame” group appears to act similarly to the sub-groups 
within the Strong Negative Emotion cluster. We conducted further analyses to see if there 
were significant differences between groups.  
 
 First, a Kruskall-Wallis test was conducted to detect any differences between sub-
groups, finding differences for both policy support, χ2 (7) = 55.744, p <0.001, and budget 
increases, χ2 (7) = 58.804, p <0.001.  
Post-hoc comparisons using Mann-Whitney tests show that the Strong Negative 
Emotion subgroups (Other-blame and Self-blame) did not differ from each other, for either 
budget increase (p= 0.618) or policy support (p=0.629). The Self-blame subgroup (Strong 
Negative) also did not differ from Low Self-blame (Weak Negative) for either budget 
increase (p= 0.351) or policy support (p= 0.294).  
 
Figure 10. Support for budget increase and policy by sub-group. Standard error is shown.  
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For the sub-groups in the Weak Negative Emotion cluster, the “Low Self-blame” 
group differed from the “Scared and Confused” group for both budget increase, p= 0.016, r2 
= 0.04, and policy support, p <0.001, r2 = 0.071. The other sub-group within this cluster 
“Moderate Optimist” also differed from the “Scared and Confused” subgroup, for budget 
increase, p= 0.013, r2<0.001, but not policy support (p= 0.328), likely due to the small cell 
size (N=12).  
 The “Scared and Confused” subgroup did not differ significantly from the 
“Disengaged Optimist” group (No Emotion cluster) for budget increase, p= 0.299, or policy 
support, p= 0.513. Finally, the two No Emotion clusters did differ significantly from each 
other for policy support, p= 0.015, r = 0.04, but not budget increase, p = 0.108, again, likely 
due to the small sample size of the “Fed Up” group (N=15). 
3.3 Discussion 
In Study 2 we aimed to compare findings from Study 1 with responses sampled from 
a general population, and to explore whether emotional responses to climate change had 
consequences for climate action. 
The themes that arose from analysis of Study 2 were somewhere in between those of 
the student and climate scientist samples. The themes “Belief” and “Action” were reflected in 
student concerns, while the themes corresponding to “Emotion” and “Preserve Earth” were 
similar to scientist responses. We cannot be sure whether differences between student and 
general samples are due to real differences, or whether they are due to more strongly 
emphasising in Study 2 that respondents should describe their “emotional” responses to 
climate change. Despite this, the level of emotional content does not differ between general 
and student samples, and scientists clearly displayed a greater range and frequency of 
emotional response than both. Overall, scientists expressed more frustration, anger, and more 
hope than either of the other samples, unlikely to have been a product of differences in 
instructions. 
The scientist and general samples both mentioned future generations and nature as 
objects of care, describing close relationships to both. However, while identity played a role 
in shaping scientists’ responses to climate change, it did not have the same prominence in the 
                                                          
1 This effect remains significant after a Bonferroni correction for 10 comparisons (where p 
must be <0.005). The other Mann-Whitney comparisons of the 8-cluster sub-groups are not 
significant, but the original 4-cluster analyses remain significant after correction.  
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general sample. Instead of manifesting as a connector to climate change, identity may have 
played a part in distancing oneself from responsibility. In the “Action” theme, many focused 
on a national-level, Australian identity, and pinpointed national government as the 
responsible actor, and source of blame for inaction. This corresponds with findings that 
identity can be used to negotiate personal responsibility for action (Caillaud, et al. 2015). 
In the quantitative results, emotion profiles predicted significant differences in 
behavioural intentions toward climate change. One group, Strong Negative Emotion (high 
anger, shame, and fear) was significantly more likely to support climate change policies and 
greater budget allocation to the environment than other groups. This group showed greater 
support for policy and budget increases than the Weak Negative Emotion profile, which in 
turn showed greater support than the No Emotion profile. While the Strong Negative Emotion 
group differed from the reported emotions of scientists – namely, a lack of hope – the group 
still maintained greater support for climate action.  
The additional analyses of the 8-subgroups also showed that within these groups, 
there are potentially important findings. Within the Strong Negative Emotion group, one 
group showed higher self-blaming emotions (guilt, shame), but there was no difference 
between their behavioural intentions. However, self-blaming emotions, even at moderate 
levels, may increase support for climate action more than other emotions. We saw this in the 
“Low Self-blame” subgroup, who, despite reporting lower intensity of negative emotions, did 
not differ from the Strong Negative Emotion subgroups on policy support and budget 
increase. On the other hand, those who reported being mostly fearful and confused reported 
as little support for climate action as those who felt virtually no emotions towards climate 
change – the least engaged group. While promising, the sub-groups were small, hence these 
results are preliminary, and need verification with larger samples.  
These profiles suggest that responses to climate change may be differentiated by 
emotion, as they have been elsewhere (see e.g., Leiserowitz, Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 2009 
and Hine et al. 2015), but we are not necessarily suggesting a segmentation approach. 
Emotional responses such as these appear to be fluid concepts, dependent upon perceptions of 
threat to valued objects. For those who feel strongly about climate change, being asked about 
their feelings also brought to mind the valued objects affected by climate change. In 
Supplementary Materials, we show that of all the clusters, the Strong Negative Emotion 
cluster spontaneously generated the largest range of objects of care, and with the greatest 
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frequency. Importantly, when caring about climate change, the specific objects of care may 
differ for different people, but the emotional responses arising from perceived threat are 
similar, and predict support for climate action in similar ways. For this reason, we should be 
careful not to treat the emotional responses as the cause of the behaviour, as they are only a 
symptom. With greater consideration of the objects of care that can connect people to climate 
change, we can understand emotional and behavioural consequences more clearly. 
The results showed that a general population sample discussed similar objects of care 
as scientists, and similar concerns about attributions of climate change as students. These 
responses were captured in clusters of distinct emotional responses to climate change, which 
predicted support for climate policies. The emotion profile that most closely resembled 
scientists’ qualitative reports predicted the greatest levels of support for climate policies. 
4. General Discussion 
4.1 Overview of Key Findings and Implications  
Current research shows that emotions can play a motivating role in climate action, but 
the precise way in which emotions relate to this motivation—why people care about climate 
change—has received less attention. The proposed conceptualisation of “caring about climate 
change” argues that climate change may not be the focus, but rather, other “objects of care” 
motivate caring about climate change. Two hypotheses follow: that these objects trigger 
emotional responses to climate change, and that the emotional responses to climate change 
predict climate action. In two studies, we examined these two hypotheses in turn.  
Climate scientists not only described more emotions, and more intense emotions, than 
both the student sample and the general population sample, these emotions were linked to 
particular “objects of care” (future generations, the planet) described by respondents as under 
threat from climate change. Closeness to these entities – future generations as children, and 
the planet as a friend or nurturing force – appears to be paired with the emotional closeness to 
climate change as an issue. This aligns with findings from the qualitative literature indicating 
that factors such as attachment to nature and anticipated harm to future generations form 
connections to the issue of climate change (Lefsrud & Meyer 2012; Byg & Salick 2009; 
Norgaard 2006).  
With a broader sample, we found profiles of emotional responses to climate change 
which explained differences in support for climate policies. Notably, the profile most 
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resembling that of scientists was related to the greatest support for climate policies and 
environmental budget allocation, and mentioned the most “objects of care” as reasons for 
their emotional responses. 
These findings substantiate our conceptualisation of “caring about climate change”. 
Objects of care that link people to climate change may be crucial to understanding why some 
people feel more strongly about the issue than others. These “objects of care” may bridge the 
psychological distance between the self and climate change, making the issue of climate 
change seem more personally relevant, evoking stronger emotions, and prompting action. 
This is not to say that people who do not care about climate change also do not care 
about future generations, or the Earth. For example, conservative appeals for fiscal 
responsibility also cite the welfare of future generations. Instead, the connection between 
those objects of care, and the threat of climate change may be stronger, more apparent for 
some than others, which could be a result of many factors, including the idea that we have a 
“finite pool of worry” (Whitmarsh, 2011). For some, the threat to objects of care (future 
generations) may take a different route, through financial rather than environmental security. 
For others, a possibility is that having made the connections, the emotions one experiences 
are uncomfortable or overwhelming, leading to motivated distancing from the issue 
(Leviston, Price & Bishop, 2014). 
The findings are consistent with both the appraisal-theoretical work on risk perception 
(Zeelenberg et al. 2008; Böhm & Pfister 2000) and Field Theory (Lewin, 1936). What we can 
glean from these theories is that emotions and actions arise from evaluations of valued 
objects, and different individuals will have different valued objects. Notably, those who 
experienced more intense emotions towards climate change generated more “objects of care”, 
and a greater range than those who felt weaker emotions. For these individuals, there may be 
stronger connectivity between the issue of climate change, and the valued objects relevant to 
their lives.  
If climate change is perceived as a threat to something about which we care, then 
identifying core objects of care may help us understand climate change engagement. Indeed, 
public engagement programs are beginning to highlight climate change consequences, not 
just to the Earth and climate systems, but to human society, mental and physical health 
(Clayton et al. 2014), and these may be crucial. Some work is being done in this area. Based 
on research with focus groups (Climate Outreach 2014), the Climate Coalition ran a 
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campaign centered around the emotional and psychological closeness of climate change 
titled: “For the love of… let’s do something about climate change”, to bring climate change 
closer to individuals by highlighting that climate change will affect things that they care 
about (The Climate Coalition 2016).  
A related point is how respondents used identities to frame their own role in climate 
action. For scientists, climate change was entrenched in multiple self-identities, and these 
identities were linked to statements about their responsibility to act. It is also worth noting 
that feeling self-referential emotions such as shame and guilt towards the issue may indicate 
that the individual perceives a stronger role for themselves in climate action. At present, 
identities are largely absent from the discourse around climate change (Ballantyne, Wibeck & 
Neset, 2016), and this is reflected in general and student samples. There is an opportunity to 
expand climate change communication to connect climate change with different identities. 
The way in which identities were expressed by scientists suggests that it is possible to engage 
with climate change in many ways, even within the same individual, and making one identity 
salient may bring attention to different objects of care.  
4.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
There are a few limitations that could be remedied with further research. First, the 
scientists were given different instructions to the students; scientists were approached to write 
about their emotions as part of a project to engage lay people with climate change, and this 
introduced a few methodological differences. Scientists were questioned by a student and a 
science communicator, who emphasised that the project would be made public, the scientists 
would be identifiable, and provided examples of what they might write about. For the student 
and general sample, the source of questioning came from “scientists” or “researchers”, and 
responses were anonymised to protect respondents’ privacy. Such differences may have led 
scientists to consider their responses in greater depth, and in a different manner. An 
additional difference is that scientists were asked to hand-write their responses, whereas 
students and the general sample typed theirs digitally. Hand-writing notes has been shown to 
lead to greater depth of engagement compared to typing (Kiefer & Velay 2016). 
Nevertheless, the instructions given to the scientists allowed us to demonstrate the role that 
“connectors” play in reducing emotional closeness from climate change. Future research 
could use the same method with members of a general population.  
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Second, the discourse around climate change is shaped by rhetoric in media and 
politics, which may determine a sequence in general responses to climate change. For the 
average person, discussion of climate change may begin at a point of popular discourse, such 
as whether it is happening, the scientific consensus, how much is anthropogenic, but may 
shift toward considerations of greater complexity and depth upon elaboration. Both student 
and general population responses reflected discourse in media, so it is possible they felt they 
needed to wade through these questions first. Similar findings have been found for the topic 
of organ donation, where discussions between participants began at a point anchored in 
popular discourse, and elaboration led to greater depth (Moloney & Walker 2002). Further 
research could investigate this in the climate change context through focus groups or 
structured interviews.  
Finally, despite clear differences between groups, there were also differences within 
them. Scientist responses were far from homogenous, and it is unlikely that all climate 
scientists feel the same way about climate change; the emotions and cognitions reported 
suggest that there may be additional types of emotional responses to climate change. 
Relatedly, scientists’ participation in the ITHYF project was in part self-selected, as they 
chose whether or not they would send in a response. It is possible that those who care more 
about climate change may have been more likely to participate. However, the intention 
behind the inclusion of this data was not to show a representative sample of climate scientists, 
but rather to present a specific group who cared about climate change. Nonetheless, it would 
also be valuable to look at other groups that may “care about climate change” strongly, such 
as activists, or people directly affected by climate change – even sceptics. 
5. Conclusion 
In two studies, this paper defined what it might mean to care about climate change.  
We provided insight into why people feel specific, or any, emotions about climate change, 
and linked these emotions to support for climate policy and budget allocation. This paper 
provided a detailed look at how scientists, students and a general population engage with and 
feel about climate change.  
We demonstrated a connection between objects of care, the emotions they evoke, and 
actions to address climate change. The concept of “objects of care” encompasses valued 
objects, people and places in one’s life, as well as core identities. Herein lies the value of a 
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Lewinian framework, which can integrate concepts from different theoretical branches of 
psychology, and explain their relationship to emotion and action. 
To broaden engagement with climate change, future climate communication efforts 
may benefit from focusing messages on the things that people care about, and by appealing to 
the different self-conceptions and identities that orient people to climate change. Linking 
climate change and other objects (e.g., focusing on different objects of care or appealing to 
different identities) can promote broader connectivity of the issue. Such discourse would 
emphasise that climate change is not an isolated phenomenon, but one that is connected to 
many areas of life, and to the lives of other beings.  
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